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APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over The Cross-Appeal 
The Appellant, Blue Ms-. - •-
reconsider and reverse its prior ruling on its sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
'In its opening Brief of Appellant, appellant referred to itself as "BCBSU" and the 
O'Connell's followed suit in their responsive brief. In its Reply and Response Brief, appellant 
calls itself "Blue Cross" and the O'Connells will, again, follow that lead in their Reply Brief. 
1 
Order of August 8, 1997, wherein this Court concluded that "the cross-appeal should not be 
dismissed based upon Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and considerations of 
judicial economy." This Court should reject this attempt to revisit a matter already fully briefed 
by the parties and decided by this Court because that ruling is the law of the case and there has 
been no change in the circumstances or the law. See State v. O'Neih 848 P.2d 694, 697, n. 2 
(Utah App. 1993); Matter of Estate of Justheim. 824 P.2d 432, 439, n.6 (Utah App. 1991).2 
However, in the event that this Court does revisit the question raised on its sua sponte 
motion, it should confirm its August 8,1997, ruling because it is correct. Blue Cross argues that 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure cannot "extend . . . jurisdiction as established by law." 
Appellant's Reply and Response Brief at 18-19 and n. l l . However this Court's interpretation of 
the Rules does not in any way extend the jurisdiction of this Court that is "established by law" 
over this case by Section 78-2a-3(2), Utah Code. That statute states: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(Emphasis added). This case was transferred from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is 
the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction, National Bank v. Lewis. 13 Utah 507, 45 Pac. 890 
(1896), but its jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of an order of any court of record is clearly 
"established by law" by Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code. Therefore, this Court's interpretation 
2While the doctrine of law of the case is not as inflexible as the doctrine of stare 
decisis, State v. CNeiL supra at 697, it is certainly similar and protects similar values. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of observing stare decisis when one 
panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a prior decision of a different panel. See, 
e.g., Renn v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995). 
2 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow the O'Connells to maintain an interlocutory cross-
appeal does not "extend jurisdiction . . . as established by law" as Blue Cross argues. 
The statutory jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is general and unlimited in Utah. 
The federal system is different. In Section 1292 of Title 28 of the United States Code (Pocket 
Part), Congress specified in detail (using four pages of text) which interlocutory matters are 
appealable in the federal courts, providing in subsection (e) that the Supreme Court may prescribe 
rules allowing for other interlocutory appeals. Thus, permissible interlocutory appeals are 
specified in the federal statutes. (The Supreme Court has apparently not extended the matters 
to be appealed by Rule pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(e).) Therefore, the federal cases3 cited by 
Blue Cross, in its Response Brief at 19 as well as in its memorandum on the motion at 9, are not 
in point because, in Utah, it is not necessary to find a particular statute, for example the 
Arbitration Act, that provides for an interlocutory appeal because the Utah appellate jurisdiction 
statutes provide for interlocutory appeals generally without any limitation. 
The state cases4 cited in the Appellant's Response Brief at 20 merely stand for the 
proposition that an order directing arbitration or requiring exhaustion of an organization's internal 
remedies is not, by itself, a "final order" which is necessary for appellate jurisdiction under those 
states' statutes. Again, Utah's appellate jurisdiction statutes generally allow interlocutory appeals 
so those cases are not in point. Furthermore, those state cases, unlike this case, did not involve 
a cross-appeal where another party had filed an appeal of the same order as a matter of right. 
3Gooding v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc.. 878 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1989); Jeske v. 
Brooks. 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1989). 
4NEA-Topeka v. Unified School Dist.. 925 P.2d 835 (Kan. 1996); Golden Lodge No. 
13 v. Easlev. 916 P.2d 666 (Colo. App. 1996). 
3 
There is simply no authority for Blue Cross' contention that, because the Arbitration Act itself 
does not extend a right to appeal an order directing arbitration, this Court lacks jurisdiction over 
such an interlocutory order in an appropriate case. 
The cross-appellants [O'Connells] conceded in their memorandum on the Court's sua 
sponte motion that they did not have an independent right to appeal the order directing arbitration 
and asserted that they were cross-appealing that issue under Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, pendant to the appeal by Blue Cross of the other side of that issue. Blue Cross argues 
in its Reply Brief at 25, n . l l , that the O'Connells' cross-appeal, as a procedural matter, is not 
properly before this Court as an interlocutory appeal because they did not comply with Rule 5. 
In answer, the O'Connells will set out hereafter the same argument they made on the Court's sua 
sponte motion. However, it should also be noted that the briefing to date has further 
demonstrated how interwoven the issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal are. In fact, for 
the most part, they are merely different sides of the same issues. 
Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, appears to allow an appeal by "any other 
party" where another party, having an appeal as a matter of right, has timely filed a notice of 
appeal. While subsection (a) of Rule 4, setting the requirements for the timely filing of an 
appeal, is limited to "a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right," subsection (d), 
pertaining to a cross-appeal, is not so limited. It is submitted therefore, that if Blue Cross had 
an appeal "as a matter of right" and timely filed its notice of appeal under Rule 4(a), the 
O'Connells as "any other party" could file notice, cross-appealing the same order, without 
establishing an independent grounds for an appeal as a matter of right or petitioning for 
permission to maintain an interlocutory appeal. This interpretation is in keeping with the purpose 
4 
as w • *11 as 1:1 le laiigi lage c f tl le R i lies • : f A ppellate Procedi u t. si nee tl i :" concerns regarding 
interruption of ongoing litigation which are ordinarily raised when a party seeks to appeal an 
interlocutory ordei an" .mufti ' iiiinitt m< "nil ill \ Awu iiiiiillir! pail " lias, as ,1 matter o! rifilii, itlurady 
interrupted the litigation and appealed that same order. Surely it makes no sense to appeal the 
issue of whether or not the district coiirt% interpretation ill illln " iff ml lln .11 hint! ion, .IIMVUIUMII 
was too narrow at this stage, and then, after the completion of the arbitration and the litigation, 
conduct another appeal to argue and determine whether the same interpretatioii of the sa me 
agreement was too broad. 
n. Controlling Authority of the Insurance Code and Administrative Rule Precludes 
Compelling Arbitration in This Case, 
Blue Cross argues in its Response Brief at 4-5, for the first time in the course of this 
C t l S C 1 , 11141 ( I J I * 111 l a liV a 1111 "' J I J" t L 1 1 1 L t l I i "I 11II I II II la IIIII111 II I ' I " i l l " " " Il 11 Il I I I I I 11 111 H " I"" U 1111 
arbitration language which is not contained in its applications but does appear in its subscriber's 
5In the District Court neither party referred the court to that chapter of the Insurance 
Code or to the particular provisions which, as will be demonstrated infra in the text, pertain 
directly to arbitration clauses in insurance applications and contracts, Section 31A-21-314(2), 
Utah Code, and the Administrative Rule implementing that provision. This was in spite of 
the fact that Blue Cross was there represented by its general counsel who, as counsel for the 
largest insurer in the state, must have been familiar with the Insurance Code and regulations 
and been aware that they constituted controlling authority directly in point. The O'Connells 
did argue unsuccessfully against enforcing the fine-print arbitration clause. R-187-188. 
In their opening brief in this Court, the O'Connells made reference to the fact that the 
arbitration clause in the "Application" was placed "in the midst of the finely-printed boiler-
plate," Brief of Appellees at 11-12, complained that it did not state that all disputes would be 
subject to arbitration and did not explain that an arbitrator's decision would be final and 
unreviewable in the courts (Ibid, at 22-24), and argued that because of this it did not meet 
the standard for an unequivocal waiver of right to access to the courts, Ibid, at 35, but at that 
time, the O'Connells were unaware of the specific requirements of Utah insurance law 
requiring prominent display and notification of all those matters and Blue Cross was 
maintaining its silence on the subject. 
5 
certificates, regardless of whether the insured read the certificate or even received a copy. (Blue 
Cross applies the broader language of the subscriber certificate to the O'Connells' cross-appeal 
as well as to its own appeal. Response Brief at 22.) As will be shown, the Insurance Code does 
not support this proposition. To the direct contrary, that Code, and the Administrative Rule that 
implements it, prohibit imposing arbitration upon the insured in the manner that Blue Cross has 
attempted to do. 
Blue Cross quotes a subsection of a provision of the Utah Code, Section 31A-21-
303(5)(a), that pertains to the termination of insurance by insurers and provides: 
[T|f the insurer offers or purports to renew the policy, but on less favorable 
terms or at higher rates, the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date if 
the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to the policyholder notice of the 
new terms or rates at least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior policy. 
Blue Cross asks this Court to apply this subsection to govern, not a question of when a change 
of rates or terms of a renewed policy takes effect, but the unrelated question of whether an 
insured is bound by arbitration terms he has not only not agreed to in writing, as the Arbitration 
Act requires,6 but has not even received or read. That is an absurd stretch of the language of that 
subsection out of its context. Another subsection of that section provides: 
The rights provided by this section are in addition to and do not prejudice 
any other rights the insureds may have at common law or under other statutes. 
Section 31A-21-303(l)(d). Even more importantly and, in fact, dispositively in this case, 
another section of that part and chapter of the Utah Insurance Code applies directly and 
6The Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of a "written agreement to submit any 
existing or future controversy to arbitration." Section 78-31A-3, Utah Code. The party 
seeking to compel arbitration must show the existence of that written agreement. Section 78-
31A-4(1), Utah Code. 
6 
speciik'iilh f«f iirhitr.ifinii |iinu<iMiis in insuraiuv i u'liments and states: • . - ,... • 
31A-21 -314 Prohibited provisions. 
Nn iiisiiiiiiict iKillm'i ••illifo I I lln i cliiiptci lllllllllli,l iiiiliiiii iiii) pmu'.inii 
(2) depriving Utah courts of jurisdiction over an action against the insurer, 
except as provided in permissible arbitration provisions; 
Section 31A-21-314 Utah Code. This section clearly prohibits language in insurance documents 
that denies insureds access to judicial remedies except for "permissible arbitration provisions." 
Adiitiiiisti^tiu Uinli '"Vlll i Permissible Arbitration Provisions, [reproduced in its entirety 
in the Addendum hereto] defines "permissible arbitration provision" and provides "guidelines 
upon which disclosure of a contract arbitration provision is to be made." Subsection 2. 
Subsec : •> *wn r ^ -i-^
 r - v. JCS: 
[E]ach application or binder pertaining to an insurance policy which 
contains a permissible arbitration provision must include or have attached a 
prominent statement substantially as follows: 
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND THE 
COMPANY MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO COURT ACTION PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF (THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION OR OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), 
A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST FROM THE 
COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED BY ARBITRATION SHALL BE 
BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE COMPANY. THE ARBITRATION 
AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED BY STATE 
LAW AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A JUDGEMENT IN ANY COURT OF 
PROPER JURISDICTION. 
Such statement must be disclosed prior to the execution of the insurance 
contract between the insurer and the policy holder and, in the case of group 
insurance, shall be contained in the certificate of insurance or other disclosure of 
benefits. 
(Underlining added; uppercase lettering in the original). 
Blue Cross failed to comply with this Rule which mandates that "each application" must 
prominently display the designated language. The arbitration language, buried in the fine-print 
7 
boiler-plate of the "Application" that the district court found to constitute the written agreement 
to arbitrate in this case, utterly fails to meet the requirements of the Rule in both form and 
content. That language states: 
I accept Binding Arbitration as the method of resolving any disputes arising between me or the covered family members 
and the Plan or a participating provider concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement. 
(The "Application" is reproduced in Addendum "D" to Appellees/Cross Appellants' opening brief 
and at R-162.) 
While the Rule requires the disclosure language to be contained in the "certificate of 
insurance" also, the mere fact that Blue Cross inserted similar language in the Subscriber 
Certificate that was sent at some unknown time "after being enrolled for the policy,"7 would not 
rectify the failure to include it, and do so prominently, in the "Application" as the Rule mandates 
it "must." Furthermore, the arbitration language in the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (R-163-
166) is not a "prominent statement" as required by the Rule—it is not in capital letters, as the use 
of such type face in the Rule suggests it must be, or emphasized or otherwise set off from the 
rest of the text in any other manner. 
The Rule also provides, Subsection 590-122-4(7) [Addendum], that arbitration provisions 
in insurance policies shall be in compliance with the Utah Arbitration Act. Thus, the Insurance 
Code provides protection to insurance consumers in addition to that which is contained within 
the Arbitration Act. Therefore, while Blue Cross argues that Utah insurance law somehow 
7The Affidavit of the Blue Cross employee did not state when (other than after 
enrollment) how or by whom the certificate was "sent." R-172 The copy of the Type 5E4 
Subscriber Certificate which was submitted by Blue Cross to the court below has "updated 6-
94" hand-written on the cover. R-163. The effective date of the O'Connell's coverage was 
October 1, 1993, (R-174) that is, nine months before that version of the certificate was 
apparently updated yet alone sent. 
8 
requirement may be satisfied by a unilateral statement sent by the insurer, the opposite is actually 
t^ 1* ,aki Utah law, the arbitration language must '"be prominently displa> ed ii i tl le application, 
the document which is signed by the subscriber before she is bound to anything, and the 
disclosure language must be substantially similar in content to that set out 11 a.- K.-.L olue 
Cross' failure to comply with the Rule implementing the statute providing for "permissible 
arbitration clauses" in insurance contracts precludes the enforcement of any of the purported 
iigrwiiuMits l',i lUbili.ilr mil ML O'Connells'claims.8 ••"'•• 
HI. Blue Cross Failed to Prove That the O'Connells Agreed to the Arbitration Language 
in the Subsci ib ei .Cei tificate ' • ' ' : • ' •" • ; ' :'; •• ' • 
A. There is No Undisputed Evidence That Would Require a Finding That the O'Connells Agreed 
to the Arbitration Language in the Subscriber Certificate 
Even if the Insurance Code did not preclude binding the O'Connells to the broader 
arbitration language in the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (upon which Blue I :. :• :.:*.: n 
arguing against the Cross-appeal in its Response at 22), Blue Cross simply failed to prove that 
the O'Connells agreed to that language as the Arbitration Act requires.9 In this regard, it must 
8In Imperial Savings Ass'n v. Lewis* 730 F. 5upp. lUbd \,u. uuui i990), a case cited 
by Blue Cross in its Responsive Brief on other points, the court found a failure to comply 
with the Administrative Rule did not constitute a statutory impediment to an arbitration 
provision but that was because the Rule was not promulgated until nine months after the 
policy in that case was issued and the court found it had no retroactive effect. 730 F. Supp. at 
1075. The Administrative Rule was clearly in effect in 1993 when Ann O'Connell signed the 
"Application" because subsection 4(5) is quoted in its current form in the 1990 decision in 
Imperial Savings, supra, at 1074. 
9The Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of a "written agreement to submit any 
existing or future controversy to arbitration." Section 78-31A-3, Utah Code. The party 
9 
be kept in mind that an evidentiary hearing was neither requested nor held below and the district 
court's rulings were based upon the arguments and affidavits submitted by the parties. In this 
context, it is inappropriate for Blue Cross to complain that the district court did not find in its 
favor on the underlying factual issue of whether the O'Connells agreed to the language in the 
Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate. Surely, such a ruling was not compelled by undisputed 
evidence. 
The O'Connells had questioned whether they had even received the Type 5E4 Subscriber 
Certificate upon which Blue Cross relies. (R-124) In an undisputed affidavit, Ann O'Connell 
denied reading either that certificate, or the Type 4M-4ML Certificate that she did receive.10 (R-
129) More importantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that the O'Connells agreed to the 
arbitration language in either version of the subscriber certificate. As argued in Section II of this 
brief, the Insurance Code does not diminish the requirement of the Arbitration Act and allow an 
insurance company to bind insureds with an unilateral document sent to the subscriber after the 
fact without also including the entire suggested language prominently in the application which 
the subscriber signs. 
seeking to compel arbitration must show the existence of that written agreement. Section 78-
31A-4(1), Utah Code. 
10The O'Connells asserted below that the introduction to the arbitration language in the 
Type 4M-ML Certificate was different from that in the Type 5E4 and was more consistent 
with their interpretation of the language in the "Application," that is, that it pertained to 
disputes concerning payment of medical bills. R-124-125. See Type 4M-ML Certificate, "D" 
Member Grievance Procedure and Step One. R-133. These provisions appear to apply to 
disputes concerning the administration, as opposed to the termination, of coverage, and to 
"claim processing" rather than the breach of other provisions of the plan, yet alone separate 
promises concerning switching groups. 
10 
B. The Fact That Some of the O'Connells Claims Are Based Upon the Subscriber Certificate is 
Not a Substitute for the Written Agreement Required by the Arbitration Act 
Blue Cross argues that, because the O'Connells assert provisions in the Subscriber 
Certificate as the basis for some of their claims in their Complaint, the O'Connells are bound by 
the arbitration language in that certificate regardless of whether they agreed to it or read it. That 
is, Blue Cross claims that the O'Connells' reliance upon Blue Cross' promises made in the 
Subscriber Certificate acts as a substitute for The O'Connells' written agreement to arbitration 
which is required by the Arbitration Act11. The sole authority Blue Cross cites for this 
proposition is Jeanes v. Arrow Insurance Company. 494 P.2d 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). 
However, in that case a third-party beneficiary seeking to enforce a contract attempted to avoid 
arbitration language therein on the grounds that she personally did not sign the contract. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that: "Compliance with the Uniform Arbitration Act was satisfied 
by the voluntary agreement between Arrow and its insureds." 494 P.2d at 1337 (emphasis 
added). In the instant case, there was no "voluntary agreement" to the arbitration language in 
the Subscriber Certificate by either of the insureds which is necessary to comply with the 
Arbitration Act. The O'Connells do not dispute that John O'Connell, as a third party beneficiary, 
could be bound to the "Application" signed by Ann O'Connell even though he did not sign it 
personally. That however is a far different proposition from that now asserted by Blue Cross that 
the O'Connells are bound by the language in the subscriber certificate that neither of them even 
saw yet alone agreed to. 
HSee note 6, supra. 
11 
C. Utah Law Does Not Bind Insureds to Arbitration Language in a Document That They Have 
Not Read or Signed, 
Blue Cross also argues that the O'Connells are bound by the language of the Subscriber 
Certificate if that document was sent to them and the they did not raise objections, even if they 
did not read the certificate or even receive it. Response Brief at 6. Blue Cross mistakenly relies 
upon Imperial Savings Ass'n v. Lewis. 730 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Utah 1990), for this erroneous 
statement of law. In that case the attorney for Imperial, the lending institution that was seeking 
to avoid arbitration, requested a copy of the title insurance policy containing the arbitration 
provision. "Imperial failed to object [to the arbitration provisions] upon review of the Policy to 
determine its rights . . ." 730 F. Supp. at 1073 (Emphasis added). Instead Imperial's attorney 
had discussions with the insurer about the insurer's defense of a suit against Imperial, including 
the insurer's disclaimer of coverage of any liability, and did not object to arbitration as a means 
of resolving that dispute until many months after his review of the policy which contained the 
arbitration language. The federal district court stated that it was guided by 1 COUCH ON 
INSURANCE 2d, Sec. 12:10 (1984), which that court quoted, 730 F. Supp. at 1073: 
An applicant who is advised of a ground upon which he is entitled to reject 
a policy tendered to him by the insurer should notify the insurer of his refusal to 
accept the policy as written; the notice should be given promptly, that is, at once, 
or at least within a reasonable time after the cause of rejection was, or should 
have been, discovered. A rejection cannot be made by a secret unexpressed 
intention. An applicant is regarded as having accepted the policy as written, if he 
reads it. or has it read to him, and does not notify the company of his rejection 
thereof. 
(Emphasis added). The federal district court in Imperial followed this reasoning and concluded 
that, in the "particular circumstances" of that case, Imperial would be deemed to have accepted 
the arbitration terms in the policy that it's attorney had reviewed and discussed with the insurer 
12 
without objecting to the arbitration clause. That holding has no application to the instant case 
where it was undisputed that the subscriber certificate was not read even if it were received. 
Blue Cross also asserts that "the O'Connells cannot escape the terms of the Certificate by 
reliance upon Ann O'ConnelTs assertion in her Affidavit that she "has not read either version of 
the Subscriber Certificates (R-129)," citing the district court's comment below that "case law is 
clear that a party has a duty to read and understand the terms of a contract before signing it." 
Blue Cross' Reply and Response Brief at 6-7. The obvious answer to this argument is that the 
O'Connells did not sign the subscriber certificate nor is it contended that they had the certificate 
in their possession at the time that Ann O'Connell signed the "Application." The lead-in 
sentences to the language of the district court which was quoted by Blue Cross were: 
Plaintiffs [O'Connells] have argued that they should not be subject to the 
arbitration because they did not read the subscriber certificates or the applications 
they signed, and thus did not have notice of the arbitration provisions. The Court 
is not compelled by this argument as it relates to the application. 
R-186. The "Application" was signed by Ann O'Connell; the subscriber certificates were not. 
It is disingenuous for Blue Cross to cite the district court and that court's reliance upon the 
holding of Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah 1984), that a party is bound by 
contracts she has signed, as support for Blue Cross' assertion that the O'Connells are bound by 
the subscriber certificate that they undisputedly did not read or sign and may not have received. 
Blue Cross implies that the district court, in repeatedly holding the O'Connells to only the 
limited language in the "Application," inadvertently overlooked Blue Cross' evidence and 
arguments regarding the broader arbitration language in the subscriber certificate. However, it 
is clear from a review of the district court's decisions below that that court was simply not 
persuaded by Blue Cross that the O'Connells agreed to the language in the subscriber certificate. 
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See R-186-188, 206, 248-249 (Addenda A, B & C to Brief of Appellees). The district court 
arrived at that decision despite Blue Cross' repeated invocation of the language in the subscriber 
certificates. R-139, 143, 210-211. The rejection of Blue Cross' contentions in this regard was 
not erroneous, yet alone, clearly so. 
IV, The Arbitration Language in the Application, as it Would be Understood by a 
Reasonable Purchaser, Would Not Require Arbitration of the O'Connells Claims. 
A. Principles of Interpretation 
The O'Connells contend that the arbitration clause in the "Application" that Ann O'Connell 
signed is unenforceable in any event because it does not comply with the requirements of the 
Insurance Code and Administrative Rule as argued in Section II of this brief. However, 
regardless of the Insurance Code, the district court erred in interpreting the arbitration language 
in that "Application" to cover all the O'Connells claims involved in this cross-appeal. 
Blue Cross argues that the language of the "Application," as well as that of the subscriber 
certificate discussed in Section EI, supra, is unambiguous and therefore should not be construed 
against the insurer. Response Brief at 8-9. Notably, Blue Cross does not quote that arbitration 
language in making that analysis. The language in the "Application" states: 
I accept Binding Arbitration as the method of resolving any disputes arising 
between me or the covered family members and the Plan or a participating 
provider concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber 
Certificate. 
R-79, 162. The O'Connells assert that the reasonable interpretation of that clause, the one that 
an ordinary purchaser would be likely to come to, is that it would apply to disputes between the 
insured or physicians and the insurance company about whether the insurance covered certain 
procedures or the extent to which the insurance company would pay medical bills. The 
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O'Connells contend that it is not reasonable to interpret that language, as Blue Cross does to 
cover any dispute "touching upon" or "contemplating the existence of" any of the matters 
covered in the certificate. Blue Cross asserts, correctly, that the "reasonable purchaser standard" 
should be used in determining if language is ambiguous, that is, "capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation." Response Brief at 9. It is submitted that most people, including 
"reasonable" ones would be likely to think that such language in an insurance application 
pertained to disputes about "claims" for coverage rather than about a wrongful termination or a 
breach of a separate agreement to allow transfers between groups. At the very least, the language 
is "capable" of being given such an interpretation by a reasonable person, and therefore should 
be given the interpretation least favorable to the insurance company that drafted it.12 
The further arguments made and cases cited by Blue Cross in its Response Brief 
pertaining to principles of interpretation are adequately addressed in the O'Connells' opening 
brief at 24-25. The O'Connells will not argue them further here except to note that those cases 
12Blue Cross also argues that an interpretation against the insurer would not necessarily 
be against arbitration which it describes (without supporting evidence) as much cheaper for 
the average insured who is not a lawyer. While the "speedy and inexpensive remedy" dictum 
is concededly often repeated in the case law, it is of doubtful current validity. The legal 
action in this case cost $170 to file which includes all court personnel including a jury. The 
American Arbitration Association would charge in excess of $5,000 for administrative costs 
alone (because the upper limit of the policy the O'Connells are seeking is $1,000,000). 
Additionally the arbitrator, or arbitrators, would charge $150 to $200 per hour. More 
importantly, arbitration in a case like this is "favorable" to Blue Cross because the result will 
not be public and no binding precedent would be set which would preclude, or make very 
expensive, similar practices by Blue Cross in the future. Clearly Blue Cross would prefer to 
discuss its dubious practices privately and compel each of its 600,000 members to arbitrate 
their complaints separately. It is one thing to arbitrate whether a doctor's bill should be paid, 
it is another to arbitrate such matters as whether Blue Cross wrongfully terminated insurance, 
made promises upon which the O'Connells relied and followed the Insurance Code in its 
conversion practices. 
15 
all involved instances where the parties were on equal footing and, for the most part, the 
arbitration language was drafted by the party seeking to evade arbitration. The uncertainty 
regarding the scope of the language in the "Application" drafted by Blue Cross could have been 
easily avoided by simply stating that "all disputes" were subject to arbitration or by simply 
following the mandates of the Administrative Rule discussed in Section n, supra. 
B. Blue Cross Misconstrues the O'Connells' Claims and Misstates the Record Concerning Those 
Claims. 
Blue Cross misconstrues the O'Connells' claims involved in the cross-appeal to be all 
based upon the subscriber certificate.13 Blue Cross even goes so far as to outrageously assert that 
the O'Connells' use of the word "contract" in the Second Cause of Action of their Complaint (R-
6) means they were alleging a "breach of the insurance contract that is subject to (and in fact 
contains) the arbitration agreement(s) to which the O'Connells object." Response Brief at 21. 
This is simply not true. The word "contract" in paragraph 24 of the Complaint very clearly is 
used to refer to Blue Cross' legal obligation "to fulfill its promise, made orally and by letter to 
convert their coverage back to the Bar group . . . upon which promise [the O'Connells] 
reasonably and foreseeably relied in cancelling their membership in that group." R-6. The 
promise sought to be enforced in the Second Cause of action was unambiguously alleged in that 
nOf course the O'Connells do not concede that those of their claims that are directly 
based upon Blue Cross' obligations set out in the Subscriber Certificate are covered by the 
language of the "Application" because a reasonable purchaser would not necessarily 
reasonably understand that language to cover more than disputes about the extent of coverage 
and payment of benefits, that is, payment of medical expenses. See Brief of Appellees at 33-
34. The O'Connells have answered Blue Cross' argument that the making of a claim based 
upon the certificate constitutes an agreement to the arbitration language in the certificate, 
supra at p. 11. 
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cause of action to have been made by Blue Cross "orally and by letter," ibid., and not in the 
Subscriber Certificate as Blue Cross claims. 
Blue Cross also asserts that the O'Connells alleged for the first time on appeal the 
existence of a "separate promise to allow the O'Connells to transfer back and forth between 
groups." Blue Cross contends that there is nothing in the record to support that the O'Connells 
were raising a "separate oral or written promise other than those made in the various insurance 
polices purchased by the O'Connells." Responsive Brief at 22. These statements are also untrue. 
As has just been demonstrated, the O'Connells alleged such a promise by Blue Cross "made 
orally and by letter" in paragraph 24 of the Second Cause of Action of the Complaint. R-6. 
The same allegations were made in paragraph 7 of the factual allegations of the O'Connells' 
complaint. R-2. It would seem obvious to any fair reader that a statement "made orally and by 
letter" was not a statement in a printed "insurance policy." 
C. Blue Cross Inappropriately Complains of the Lack of Evidence Supporting and the Merits of 
the O'Connells Substantive Claims Made in the Litigation. 
Blue Cross inappropriately complains of a lack of evidentiary support for the O'Connells' 
allegations concerning the promises Blue Cross made which induced the O'Connells to give up 
their long term coverage with the Bar group. Responsive Brief at 22-23. Blue Cross, at this 
point, has not answered the O'Connnells' Complaint, made any effort to refute the O'Connells' 
allegations in the Complaint, nor conducted any discovery and is in no position to complain 
about the lack of "evidence in the record." Blue Cross has made no general motion for summary 
judgment. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that the allegations of a complaint be 
supported with evidence upon filing. However, Blue Cross' statement that there is no evidence 
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in the record of a written or oral promise other than those made in the various insurance policies 
is also simply untrue. The facts supporting the allegations concerning Blue Cross' assurances 
concerning transfers between groups are contained in Ann O'ConnelTs unchallenged Affidavit 
in Opposition to Motion to Arbitrate. R-127, 128. It is also clear in that affidavit that those 
assurances were made in writing outside of Blue Cross' "policies" or "subscriber certificates." 
Blue Cross also inappropriately argues the merits of the O'Connells' claim of a contract, 
based upon the promises Blue Cross' made and the O'Connells' reliance thereon in giving up their 
membership in the Bar group, by arguing that the O'Connells have shown no consideration for 
Blue Cross' promises. Responsive Brief at 23. The issue before this Court is what disputes, if 
any, the O'Connells agreed to arbitrate. The merits of the parties positions in those disputes are 
not now before the Court. At the appropriate time, the O'Connells will explain the doctrine of 
promissory reliance and other points of contract law and produce their supporting evidence. 
V. Blue Cross Fails to Show That the O'Connells Have Waived Their Constitutional Right 
to Access to the Courts as to the Claims Involved in the Cross-appeal. 
blue Cross' only response to the O'Connells' argument, that the arbitration language in the 
"Application" failed to express "in the most unequivocal terms" that the O'Connells were waiving 
their rights to access to the courts and remedy by law as required by Article I, Sections 7 and 
11, Constitution of Utah, is to claim that the Supreme Court in Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. 
Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Utah 1981), "specifically rejected exactly these arguments." 
Response Brief at 23-24. To the contrary, while the Court in Lindon City found no constitutional 
violation in the circumstances of that case, the Court stated: 
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Under Article I, Section 11, [Constitution of Utah] a party may 
intentionally and deliberately waive the ordinary and usual remedy to which a 
party is entitled for the redress of a wrong, but such waiver should be expressed 
in the most unequivocal terms. 
636 P.2d at 1074 (Emphasis added). In Lindon City, it was not difficult to find a waiver of the 
right to access to the courts because the party that was seeking to avoid arbitration was the party 
that drafted the agreement to arbitrate. In this case, on the otherhand, the arbitration agreement 
was buried in the fine print of an "Application" drafted by Blue Cross and signed by the 
O'Connells as an adhesion contract and that language did not say one word about waiving access 
to the courts, yet do so in "the most unequivocal terms" as the Lindon City dictum requires. (A 
copy of the "Application" appears in Addendum "D" to Appellees Brief.) 
The O'Connells suggested in their opening brief, at 35, that, to comply with the dictum 
of Lindon Citv. the language should appear in capital letters and be similar to that enforced in 
Sosa v. Paulos. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,27 (Sup. Ct. 1996). At the very minimum, the language 
should be in capital letters and otherwise comply with the Administrative Rule as argued in 
Section II of this brief at p.p. 5-9. That rule was adopted to define "permissible arbitration 
provisions" as used in the statute which prohibited clauses in insurance policies "depriving Utah 
courts of jurisdiction over an action against an insurer, except as provided in permissible 
arbitration provisions." Section 31A-21-314, Utah Code. It would, therefore, set the minimum 
standards for finding a waiver by an insured of the constitutional right of access to the courts. 
VI. Blue Cross Seriously Misstates the O'Connells' Argument Regarding Attorney Fees 
Blue Cross states that "The only argument the O'Connells make on the attorney fee issue 
is that Blue Cross waived its right to request attorney fees because the request was not made to 
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the trial court/' Response Brief at 24 (Emphasis added). This is untrue. The O'Connells also 
argued in their opening brief, at 36-37, that the awarding of attorney fees is discretionary by 
statute.14 (Blue Cross' claim that it is "entitled to" attorney fees under law is simply incorrect.) 
The O'Connells also complained (ibid.) that Blue Cross gave no reasons for its request for 
attorney fees, even for fees in this court, so it was difficult to argue against it. Nonetheless, the 
O'Connells there set out reasons why Blue Cross should not be awarded attorneys fees for this 
appeal and cross-appeal. Ibid. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in ordering arbitration of the claims in the O'Connells complaint, 
other than the statutory claim, because Blue Cross failed to disclose the arbitration agreement as 
required by the Insurance Code and Regulations, because the O'Connells did not agree to 
arbitrate those claims, and because the O'Connells did not unequivocally waive their 
constitutional right to access to the courts. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s ^ g ^ day of June, 1998. 
)HN D. O'CONNELL 
attorney for Plaintiffs -
'Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
"Section 78-31a-16 states: 
An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by 
the court shall be treated and enforced in all respects as a 
judgment. Costs incurred incident to any motion authorized by 
this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's fee, unless 
precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the 
court. (Emphasis added). 
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ADDENDUM 
Administrative Rule 590 - 122 
Permissible Arbitration Provisions 
R590-121-8 INSURANCE 
and the application of such provision shall not be 
affected thereby 
R590-121-8. D i s semina t ion . 
Each insurer or rate service organization is in-
structed to distribute a copy of this rule to all 
personnel engaged in activities requiring knowledge 
of this rule, and to instruct them as to its scope and 
operation 
References: 31A-2-201 
History: 9062, PRO, 03/01/88, 11853, AMD, see CPR, 
11853, CPR, 10/01/91,12466, AMD, 03/12/92,15517, AMD, 
04/06/94, 16307, AMD, 12/30/94 
R590-122. Permissible Arbitration Provi-
sions. 
R590-122-1 Authority 
R590-122-2 Purpose and Scope 
R590-122-3 Definitions 
R590-122-4 Rule 
R590-122-1. Authority. 
This Rule is promulgated by the commissioner of 
Insurance under the general authority granted un-
der Section 31A-2-20K3), Utah Code Annotated, to 
adopt rules for the implementation of the Utah 
Insurance Code, and under Section 31A-21-
201(2)(a)(iv) thereof, specifically authorizing the 
commissioner to disapprove insurance contract 
forms filed contrary to law 
R590-122-2. Purpose and Scope. 
This Rule recognizes the emergence of arbitration 
as a speedy and mexpensive method of alternative 
dispute resolution The Rule is NOT intended to 
create procedural guidelines for the administration 
of arbitration proceedings once commenced This 
rule is mtended to 
1 define the term "permissible arbitration provi-
sion" as set forth in Sections 31A-21-313(3)(c) and 
31A-21-314(2), Utah Code Annotated, 
2 provide guidelines upon which disclosure of a 
contract arbitration provision is to be made This 
Rule is applicable to both individual and group 
contracts and to all classifications or lines of insur-
ance 
R590-122-3. Definitions. 
For the purpose of this rule, the commissioner 
adopts the definitions as particularly set forth in 
Section 31A-1-301, Utah Code Annotated, and in 
addition thereto the following 
1 Those certain definitions set forth m Section 
78-31a-2, Utah Code Annotated of the "Utah Arbi-
tration Act" 
2 "Compulsory non-binding arbitration" means a 
contract provision requiring an insured to exhaust a 
procedure of extra-judicial arbitration as a condition 
precedent to the pursuit of an otherwise available 
judicial remedy 
3 "Compulsory binding arbitration" means a con-
tract provision requiring arbitration as an auto-
matic and exclusive remedy for any dispute involv-
ing a contract of insurance to the exclusion of anv 
otherwise available judicial r e r ^ d y provided that 
the claim or controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 
limit of the small claims court of the state where the 
action would be brought 
4 "Optional binding arbitration" means a contract 
provision requiring any party to an insurance con-
tract to submit to arbitration as set forth in such 
contract at the election of any contractmg party, 
provided tha t the claim or controversy exceeds the 
jurisdictional limit of the small claims court of the 
state where the action would be brought 
R590-122-4. Rule. 
1 Compulsory non-binding arbitration is contrary 
to the public interest and is not a "permissible 
arbitration provision " 
2 Optional binding arbitration at the exclusive 
election of an insured party is a "permissible arbi-
tration provision," in which case the disclosure pro-
visions in paragraph 5 below shall not be applicable 
3 Both compulsory and optional binding arbitra-
tion at the election of either the insured or the 
insurer are "permissible arbitration provisions " 
4 Pohcy forms containing optional binding arbi-
tration provisions for the exclusive election of an 
insurer will be disapproved under Section 31A-21-
201(2)(a)(iv) Such provisions in previously approved 
forms are declared not enforceable They will be 
construed under Section 31A-21-107 and apphed as 
if in compliance with the Insurance Code 
5 Except as excluded in paragraph 2 above, each 
application or binder pertaining to an insurance 
pohcy which contains a permissible arbitration pro-
vision must mclude or have attached a prominent 
statement substantially as follows 
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU 
AND THE COMPANY MAY BE SUBJECT TO AR-
BITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COURT 
ACTION PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF (THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION OR 
OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), A COPY 
OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST FROM 
THE COMPANY ANY DECISION REACHED BY 
ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON 
BOTH YOU AND THE COMPANY THE ARBITRA-
TION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IF ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE EN-
TERED AS A JUDGEMENT IN ANY COURT OF 
PROPER JURISDICTION 
Such statement must be disclosed prior to the 
execution of the insurance contract between the 
insurer and the policy holder and, m the case of 
group insurance, shall be contained in the certificate 
of insurance or other disclosure of benefits 
6 Both compulsory binding arbitration provisions 
and optional binding arbitration provisions shall not 
be construed to preclude any dispute resolution by 
any small claims court having jurisdiction 
7 All arbitration provisions contained in insur-
ance pohcies shall be in compliance with the "UTAH 
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ARBITRATION ACT" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah 
Code Annotated). 
8. Any such agreement for arbitration shall not 
obligate any insured to pay more than 50% of the 
advance payments required to begin the arbitration 
process. 
This rule supersedes Bulletin 87-2. 
References: 31A-21-201. 
History: 14875, AMD, 12/23/93. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effectiveness. 
Although § 31A-21-314 was amended in 1987 to allow 
insurance policies to contain permissible arbitration provi-
sions, these provisions were not denned in the rules until 
198^; however, this gap between the amendment and the 
rules did not mean that a binding arbitration provision 
could not be included in an insurance policy. (Former 
R540-122.) Imperial Sav. Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068 
(D. Utah 1990). 
R 5 9 0 - 1 2 3 . A d d i t i o n s a n d D e l e t i o n s o f D e s -
i g n e e s b y O r g a n i z a t i o n s . 
R590-123-1. Authority. 
R590-123-2. Purpose. 
R590-123-3. Rule. 
R590-123-4. Penalties. 
R590-123-5. Separability. 
R590-123-1. Authority. 
This rule is promulgated by the insurance com-
missioner under Sections 31A-2-20K3) and 31A-2-
211(2), Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.), to adopt rules 
to iinplement the provisions of the Utah Insurance 
Code, and specifically Sections 31A-23-215(2), 
U.C.A., authorizing the commissioner to establish 
by rule the form to be utilized by an organization 
when promptly reporting every change in the list of 
natural persons authorized to conduct business on 
behalf of the organization in this state. 
R590-123-2. Purpose . 
A, Organizations who conduct insurance transac-
tions through natural persons in this state shall be 
licensed. The organization license shall identify the 
names of natural persons, also known as designees, 
authorized to act for the organization. Organizations 
are required to promptly report to the commissioner, 
in detail and form prescribed by rule, every change 
in their list of natural persons. 
B. This rule is adopted for the purpose of stating 
the detail, form, and time by which an organization 
will either add or delete any natural person from 
their list of authorized designees who conduct busi-
ness on behalf of the organization in this state. 
R590-123-3. Rule. 
A. Notice of addition or deletion of designees. All 
organizations shall file with the commissioner an 
Application For Amendment to Organization Li-
cense which includes a section for changing the list 
October 1, 1996 UTAH ADMINIS' 
of natural persons authorized to conduct business on 
behalf of the organization in this state. The forms 
necessary to effectuate such changes are available 
through the Insurance Department. 
1. Procedure for amending an organization li-
cense: 
a. Complete the application for amendment to 
organization license and include the information 
concerning designees to be added or deleted. 
b. The date entered on the form will be the 
effective date of the change. 
c. File the completed form with the department 
within five working days from the effective date. If 
the form is not filed within the five day period, the 
effective date of the amendment will be the date the 
form is received by the insurance department. 
B. Fees. The organization shall pay the statutory 
filing fees for all Organization License applications 
and amendments submitted to the department. 
R590-123-4. Penal t ies . 
Any organization tha t fails to comply with this 
rule will be subject to the forfeiture provisions set 
forth in Sections 31A-2-308 and 31A-23-216, U.C.A. 
R590-123-5. Separability. 
If airy provision of this rule or the application of it 
to any person is for any reason held to be invalid, the 
remainder of the rule and the application of any 
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not 
be affected. 
References: 31A-2-211, 31A-23-215. 
History: 9276, NEW, 05/01/88; 14876, AMD, 12/23/93. 
R59CK124. L o s s I n f o r m a t i o n R u l e . 
R590-124-1. Authority. 
R590-124-2. Purpose and Scope. 
R590-124-3. Definitions. 
R590-124-4. Rule. 
R590-124-5. Penalties. 
R590-124-6. Separability. 
R590-124-7. Effective Date. 
R590-124-1. Authority. 
This rule is promulgated by the Insurance Com-
missioner pursuant to the general authority granted 
under Subsection 31A-2-20K3), Utah Code Anno-
tated, to adopt rules for the implementation of the 
Utah Insurance Code and under Subsection 31A-23-
302(8), U.C.A., authorizing the commissioner to de-
fine unfair methods of competition. 
R590-124-2. Purpose and Scope. 
(1) Accurate loss information is necessary in un-
derwriting and rating insurance policies. The pur-
pose of this rule is to provide for the prompt dissemi-
nation of loss information between insurers and 
their insureds. 
(2) This rule applies to every authorized property 
and liabihty insurer licensed to do business in Utah 
writing those lines of insurance commonly identified 
as conunercial property and commercial liability, 
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